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We propose a conformity-driven reproductive ability in which an individual i is more (less) likely
to imitate a neighbor j’s strategy if j’s strategy is majority (minority) in i’s neighborhood. The
results on the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game show that, compared to homogeneous
reproductive ability, conformity-driven reproductive ability can greatly enhance cooperation. This
finding is robust with respect to different types of network structures (including square lattice
and scale-free network) and to different ways of strategy updating (including synchronous and
asynchronous strategy updating).
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
To understand the emergence of cooperative behav-
ior among selfish individuals, researchers have considered
various mechanisms, such as network reciprocity [1, 2],
voluntary participation [3, 4], aspiration [5–7], social di-
versity [8, 9], migration [10–12], chaotic payoff varia-
tions [13], extortion [14–16], punishment [17–20], and so
on.
The reproductive ability, also is known as the teaching
ability or the learning ability, has been extensive studied
in the evolutionary games [21–26]. Szolnoki et al pro-
posed an inhomogeneous teaching ability in which the
probability that the individual i adopts a randomly cho-
sen neighbor j’s strategy depends on the payoff difference
and a two-value pre-factor ω characterizes the teaching
ability of neighbor j [21]. They found that inhomoge-
neous teaching ability can promote cooperation for the
prisoner’s dilemma games in lattices [21] and complex
networks [22]. Guan et al found that the introduction of
the inhomogeneous activity of teaching of individuals can
remarkably promote cooperation in spatial public goods
games [23]. Szolnoki and Perc defined the teaching ability
of a node i as its collective influence which is the product
of its reduced degree and the total reduced degree of all
j nodes at a hierarchial depth ℓ from node i [24]. It was
found that there exists an optimal hierarchical depth for
the determination of collective influence that favors co-
operation. Chen et al proposed an inhomogeneous learn-
ing ability in which the two-value pre-factor ω character-
izes the strength of the individual i’s own learning activ-
ity [25]. They found that appropriate intermediate levels
of learning activity can promote or sustain cooperation
for the prisoner’s dilemma games in small-world networks
and scale-free networks. Wu et al discovered that coop-
eration on square lattices is promoted (inhibited) in the
case of synchronous (asynchronous) strategy updating, if
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heterogeneous learning ability is considered [26].
In many real-life situations, an individual tends to fol-
low the majority in behavior or opinion within the inter-
action range. Recently, the consideration of conformity
has attracted much attention in the study of evolution-
ary games. Szolnoki and Perc designated a fraction of
population as being driven by conformity rather than
payoff maximization [27, 28]. These conformists simply
adopt whichever strategy is most common within their
interaction range at any given time, regardless of the ex-
pected payoff. They showed that an appropriate fraction
of conformists within the population introduces an ef-
fective surface tension around cooperative clusters and
ensures smooth interfaces between different strategy do-
mains.
Motivated by the work of Szolnoki and Perc, we pro-
pose a conformity-driven reproductive ability in which
the probability that the individual i adopts a randomly
chosen neighbor j’s strategy depends on the payoff dif-
ference and a pre-factor ωij characterizing the popularity
of j’s strategy among i’s neighbors. The value of ωij is
above (below) 0.5 if j’s strategy is majority (minority) in
i’s neighborhood. Different from previous works of the
teaching ability, the pre-factor in our model is determined
not only by j but also by i’s other neighbors.
II. MODEL
Our model is described as follows.
Player x can take one of two strategies: cooperation or
defection, which are described by
sx =
(
1
0
)
or
(
0
1
)
, (1)
respectively. At each time step, each individual plays the
prisoner’s dilemma game with its nearest neighbors. An
individual will punish the neighbors that hold different
strategies. The accumulated payoff of player x can thus
2be expressed as
Px =
∑
y∈Ωx
sTxMsy, (2)
where the sum runs over the nearest neighbor set Ωx of
player x and M is the rescaled payoff matrix given by
M =
(
1 0
b 0
)
. (3)
Here the parameter b(> 1) denotes the temptation to
defect.
Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly dis-
tributed with the equal probability 0.5. Players asyn-
chronously update their strategies in a random sequen-
tial order [29–31]. Firstly, an individual i is randomly se-
lected who obtains the payoff Pi according to the above
equations. Next, individual i chooses one of its near-
est neighbors at random, and the chosen neighbor j also
acquires its payoff Pj . Finally, individual i adopts the
neighbor j’s strategy with the probability [21]:
W (si ← sj) = ωij
1
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/K]
, (4)
where K characterizes the noise introduced to permit
irrational choices and ωij characterizes the ability that j
transfers its strategy to i.
We define the reproductive ability ωij as:
ωij =
1
1 + exp[(ki/2−Nsj )/H ]
, (5)
where Nsj is the number of players adopting strategy sj
within the interaction range of player i (including j it-
self), ki is the degree of player i, and H(> 0) represents
the steepness of the function. The more popular is j’s
strategy in i’s neighborhood, the higher is the reproduc-
tive ability of j. For H = ∞, the reproductive ability is
a constant equaling 0.5. In this situation, our model is
restored to the original homogeneous ability. Conversely,
for H = 0 the reproductive ability becomes steplike so
that i refuses to adopt strategy sj if this strategy is mi-
nority in i’s neighborhood.
III. RESULTS
Following the previous studies [32, 33], we set the noise
level to be K = 0.1. The key quantity for characterizing
the cooperative behavior of the system is the fraction
of cooperators ρc in the steady state. In the following
simulation, ρc is obtained by averaging over the last 10
3
Monte Carlo steps (MCS) of the entire 105 MCS. Each
MCS consists of on average one strategy-updating event
for all individuals. Each data is obtained by averaging
over 100 different realizations. Unless otherwise specified,
all our simulations are performed in a 100 × 100 square
lattice with the periodic boundary condition.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a
function of the temptation to defect b for different values of
the steepness parameter H . For each value of H , ρc decreases
to 0 as b increases. For small values of H (e.g., H = 0.01 or
H = 0.3), cooperators can occupy the whole system when b
is small. However, for large values of α (e.g., α = 10), full
cooperation cannot reach even b = 1.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a
function of the steepness parameter H for different values of
the temptation to defect b. The results from (a) simulation
and (b) theoretical analysis, respectively.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperators ρc as a func-
tion of the temptation to defect b for different values of
the steepness parameter H . From Fig. 1, one can see
that, for each value ofH , ρc decreases to 0 asH increases.
For small values of H (e.g., H = 0.01 or H = 0.3), full
cooperation can reach when b is below a threshold value.
However, for large values of H (e.g., H = 10), coopera-
tors cannot take over the whole system even b = 1.
Figure 2 shows the fraction of cooperators ρc as a func-
tion of the steepness parameter H for different values of
the temptation to defect b. We see that, for relatively
small values of b (e.g., b = 1.01), ρc decreases as H in-
creases. However, for larger values of b (e.g., b = 1.05
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Snapshots of typical distributions of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red) at different time steps.
Initially, we set cooperators (defectors) in the left (right) half of square lattices. The temptation to defect b = 1.05. The
steepness parameter H is H = 0.3 for (a)-(d) and H = 10 for (e)-(h). For H = 0.3, the cooperator cluster continually expands
and the boundary between the two competing clusters keeps smooth during the whole evolution. For H = 10, the defector
cluster continually expands and the boundary becomes littery as time evolves.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The time evolution of the average num-
ber of cooperative neighbors 〈nc〉 for players along the inter-
faces separating domains of cooperators and defectors. We
define a player along the the interface as the one who has at
least one neighbor with the opposite strategy. The temptation
to defect b = 1.05. For each value of the steepness parameter
H , 〈nc〉 firstly decreases and then increases as time evolves.
or 1.09), there exists an optimal value of H (about 0.2)
leading to the highest cooperation level. The dependence
of ρc on H can be qualitatively predicted analytically
through a pair-approximation analysis [34, 35], the re-
sults of which are shown in Fig. 2(b).
To intuitively understand why the moderate value ofH
that can best enhance cooperation, we plot spatial strat-
egy distributions as time evolves for different values of H
when the temptation to defect b = 1.05. Initially we set a
giant cooperator (defector) cluster in the left (right) half
of square lattices. From Figs. 2(a)-(d), one can see that
for the moderate value of H (e.g., H = 0.3), the coopera-
tor cluster continually expands while the defector cluster
gradually shrinks. Note that for H = 0.3, the boundary
between the two competing clusters remains smooth dur-
ing the whole evolution. However, for the large value of
H (e.g., H = 10), the defector cluster gradually invade
the cooperator cluster and the original one big cooperator
cluster is divided into some small clusters [see Figs. 2(e)-
(h)]. For H = 10, the interfaces separating domains of
cooperators and defectors become littery. As pointed out
in Ref. [36, 37], noisy borders are beneficial for defectors,
while straight domain walls help cooperators to spread.
For the very small value of H (e.g., H = 0.01), the coop-
erator and defector clusters keep almost unchanged (the
results are not shown here).
Next, we study the average number of cooperative
neighbors 〈nc〉 for players along the interfaces separat-
ing domains of cooperators and defectors. A player is
along the interface if it has at least one neighbor with
the opposite strategy. Figure 4 shows the time evolution
of 〈nc〉 for different values of the steepness parameter H
when the temptation to defect b = 1.05. One can see that
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the steepness parameter H for different values of the
temptation to defect b under different types of networks and different kinds of updating rules. Left panel: for square lattices and
synchronous updating rule. Middle panel: for scale-free networks and asynchronous updating rule. Right panel: for scale-free
networks and synchronous updating rule. The network size is set to be 10000 and the average degree of the network is 4. Note
that for scale-free networks, we use degree-normalized payoffs.
initially 〈nc〉 decreases from 2 to about 1.6, and then in-
creases to a stable value. For the small value of H (e.g.,
H = 0.01) and the large value of H (e.g., H = 2), the
final value of 〈nc〉 is below 2. However, for the moder-
ate value of H (e.g., H = 0.3), 〈nc〉 finally reaches 3.1.
Once the value of 〈nc〉 exceeds 2, cooperation becomes
the majority strategy in a player’s neighborhood. In this
case, the conformity-driven reproductive ability is bene-
ficial for the expansion of cooperator clusters.
In all the above studies, we use square lattices and
asynchronous strategy updating. In fact, our finding that
the moderate value of the steepness parameter H can
best promote cooperation is robust with respect to dif-
ferent kinds of network structures and different ways of
strategy updating. Since square lattice is homogeneous
interaction networks, it is interesting for us to consider
heterogeneous interaction networks. We use the famous
Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks to construct hetero-
geneous interaction [38]. In the asynchronous updating
rule, at each time only a randomly selected player is al-
lowed update its strategy. While in synchronous updat-
ing rule, at each time all players update their strate-
gies. We consider three cases: square lattices with
synchronous strategy updating, scale-free networks with
asynchronous strategy updating and scale-free networks
with synchronous strategy updating. From Fig. 5, one
can see that for all these cases, the cooperation level
reaches the highest at the moderate value of H when
the temptation to defect b is fixed.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
To summarize, we have proposed a conformity-driven
reproductive ability in which the probability that a player
i adopts a neighbor j’s strategy depends on their payoff
difference and a pre-factor ωij characterizing the popu-
larity of j’s strategy among i’s neighbors. The value of
ωij increases with the number of i’s neighbors holding
the same strategy with j. Both numerical and theoret-
ical results show that, the cooperation level of the spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma game can be greatly enhanced by
moderately increasing the teaching ability of the neigh-
bor with the majority strategy in the local community.
In the case of the conformity-driven reproductive ability,
the borders of cooperator clusters become smooth, thus
cooperators along the borders can get more help to resist
the invasion of defectors. Note that the concept of con-
formity is widely existent in opinion dynamics [39, 40].
We hope our work can attract more interest in the study
of the heterogeneous reproductive ability based on the
opinion dynamics.
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